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In 2012 May, fierce fighting for control rights broke out between the domestic 
lighting industry leading NVC founder Wu Changjiang and investor Yan Yan. This 
event became one of the year's most impressive economic events. This is since the 
establishment of NVC, around the company control rights contest second fierce 
confrontation occurred. NVC is a native Chinese private enterprise, its business 
development experience is typical and representative in the tens of thousands of 
Chinese private enterprises. NVC control competition reflects some of the problems 
associated with the company governance. A comprehensive review of NVC 
entrepreneurship development experience, not only can help us more clearly 
understand the two control right conflict situations, but also from the case material 
stripping out key details and clues, we can analyze the influence of ownership 
structure, private equity investment, stakeholders. 
The method of case study and literature research method is used in this paper, the 
text is divided into six chapters. The first chapter is Intruduction.The second chapter is 
the theory summary part. First of all, defines the basic concept of corporate 
governance ，inducts the equity theory and  stakeholder theory, reviews effects of 
private equity investment in corporate governance . The third chapter proposes the 
question to some corporate governance point of view, preliminary on the problem 
description. The fourth chapter introduces the NVC case, reveals the conflict between 
the shareholders and the shareholders and the conflict between entrepreneurs and 
investors. The fifth chapter in-depth analyses the two fightings for control rights, the 
impact of private equity investment and stakeholders,then put forward my own point 
of view and interpretation of some problems in the case. The sixth chapter answers 
questions in second chapter , further elaborates rely solely on the structure of 
ownership control can not solve the private enterprise governance efficiency. 














this difference is an important cause of conflict. In addition, the innovations of this 
paper are: the classification of stakeholders is dynamic, only those core interests 
stakeholders with significant influence will actively participate in and can affect the 
result of corporate governance. On this basis, the private enterprise entrepreneurs are 
the soul of enterprise culture, entrepreneurship has positive influence on corporate 
governance, suggest entrepreneurs how to ensure the control rights.  
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